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In the Supreme Cowt
of the State of Utab
EDWARD A. KNAUS and EDNA
Ki\1 AUS~ his wife,

Pla,inti ff s and A ppe1/antJ

j

vs .

Case No.

JAMES EARL SMITH and ZELDA

9071

P. SMITH, his. "·ife,
R. V. MANNING and LOIS MANNING, his vlife,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents cannot agree with

appellants~

statement of
the case~ nor with the statement of appellants as to the points
raised by this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal involves a dispute over ownership of a strip
of ground approximately 6 feet wide and 227 feet in depth
3
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at 6 76 East 48th South Street, Murray) Utah, and worth $200.00
(R. 113). As Case No~ 113422 in the Third District Court
an action was tried

bet"·een the respondents Ma1U1ing and

the contract purchasers from the a ppell ants named Packard
a~d 'vith a decision favorable to the Mannings (R. 38) . After
losing that action~ the Packards and appellants Knaus signed
an agreement which made Packards renters and was designed
to restore a ppel Iants to full ownership as evidenced by a
quit~claim deed (R. 23 and 24).

This prior action v.ras pleaded as a bar to the present
action (RT 14 Second De£ense) , This issue was stated in the
pretrial order as Item 5 (a) (R. 38).
·
By their counterclaim ( R. 4 2 and 4 3) and the pretrial
order ( R. 39) respondents raised twu affirmative grou~ds
for quieting their title against appellant, these being: firstt that
they are t_he· ov.rner.s of the disputed strip by acquiescence and)
second, that the disputed strip passed to Smith as an apput·
. tenance to the purchase of the house from the cotnmon owner
of all of the land.

The court gave judgment to the respondent on the theory
that the d 1spu ted strip can1e in to the owncrshi p of Smith as
part of th€ house and lot at the purchase in 19 39 (Findings
of Fact, and Conclusion of Law T\~o. 1) R. 551 56~ 57).
Appellants have not speci fie ally attacked a.ny of the
·Findings of Fact~ although that is of necessity the burden of
appellants. Respondents will therefore refer the court to the
.ev_idence wh~ch sup ports the Findings of Factl and also to
the e~.ldence from plaintifFs witnesses and uncontroverted

. ·4
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evidence £rom defendant's witnesses on the •ssue of res

judicata

0r

estoppe1
r

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no dispute as to the facts. supporting Findings of
1~

2, 3, and 4 (R+ 55). The deed to plainti_ff is
shown in the abstract, Exhibit 1~ p. 71. The Smi_ths sold to the
Mannings all of Lot 1 and the east 10 feet of Lot 2 (Exhibit
17) and used .the same description as on the deed to Smith
(Smith Dep. p. 29). Smith purchased the land in 1939 and
occupied it personally until 19 50 (Smith Dep~ p. 2) and.
sold the property in 1954 (Smith Dep. p~ 3-Man~ing Dep. 3,
19~ 20) . Common ownership of both tracts prior to. 1939
is shown by the abstract (Exhibit 1 pp. 39 and 51 apd by
the Smith Deposition (p. 24 - R. 137~139). The sale by the
common owner to Burt A. Hughes:t the predecessor. of pla_intiff
was in 1945 (Exhibit 1~ p+ 58). And the width of Lot 1.
as beiJ;tg 54.1 feet is shown by the plat in tqe back of Exhibit 1+

Fact Nos.

•

•:

•

I

t

t

Finding of Fact No. 5 is as follows:
~~The

land exhibited to the defendants Smith by the
agent of the· seller appeared to have parallel east and
west lines at a distance of 64. 1 £eet from each other
with a fence marking the east boundary and included
a house~ garage and barn, with a driveway along the
extreme _westerly portion of the apparent tract~ which
was in open and obvious long standing use and was
the. only means of ingress and egress to and from· the
gar age and the barn and the south portion .of the
property purchased by defendants ~mith of a total
depth of approximately 500 feet and extending approximatejy 350 feet south of the house.
1

'

s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-·

James Ear1 Smith testified in his deposition that he bought
the pr?perty from William Linnell through Zions Savings
B~nk .(Dep. 3) and t~at he \valked over the

property along
both sides and I defini.tel_y understood the dri ~ewa y was in~
eluded in _the prope~'· (Dep+ 4). The driveway ··\vas there
a~d it s~emed to .fit the description of the p~o perty as I recal~. Well, I kne,v it did o.r I "W~ouJdn't have bought itL" He
. understood that the property had straight lines as boundaries
and a picket in the back of the lot was pain ted to as indicating
the we:s t lin~ connecting with the horizontal striping on the
sidewalk at the north end of the property~ the fence along the
4

t

east boundary extending the whole length of the property

( D ep+ 5 and 6) , except that the ea:s t fence ran into a chic ken
coop and then continued on the other side (Dep. 6 and 7).
The Peter son house was constructed five or six feet west of
the \Vest line of the drive\va y

(Dep. 7) ~ While Smith lived

on the property there was no dispute about use of the drive·
v.ray ( Dep. 7) there was no other way of getting into his
gar~ge (Dep. 7) and no one living to the west attempted to
use or control or claim the drive~ray (Dep. 8 and 9), the red
barn at the rear was all on the property he purchased and the
drivev,.yay exetnded ~Test of that barn (Dep. 12). Exhibit nA~"
no\v Exhibit 13, has an arrow pointing to the separation crack
and the west ~n d of the horizontal lines which marked the west
end of his property on the front sidewalk (Dep. 6 and 14) ~
Peterson. constr~cted his home to the west in 1947. Prior to
that Burt AL .Hughes had a garden on the property to the
~est irrigated from a small irrigation ditch running northerly
from the south, .fi.ye or six feet east of the east line of the

6
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house Peterson built ( Dep. 18 and 19) . All of the driveway

was necessary to get in and out of the garage (Dep. 27) .
Burt A. Hughes testified that he purchased the property
west of the old Linnell home March 29, 1945 from Linnell,
who was his brother-in-law (R .. 15 3) . He had been_ acquainted
with the property for some time and knew that the only way
of reaching the outbuildings on the Linnell property was ·
over the driveway on the west side of the house. He was .
suff ic ientl y f a.miliar \Vi th the property that it was not n~essai"y
to go over it before he made his purchase of all of the property
except Lot 1 and the west 10 feet of Lot 2 (R. 154 and 155).
He understood the boundary to be the east side of the irrigation ditch running north and south, west of the driveway
(R. 15 5). The only way to reach the garage back of th.e house
and facing west was through the driveway and turning,_ east
into the garage (R. 155) He sold the property to his daughter,
\vho v...·as also familiar with the property as she had been down
there on several ocasi ons when they were irrigating the garden
(R. 156). There were tvlo poplar trees on the east side of
the driveway (R. 159). He didn"t ever use the driveway
while he owned the property (R. 155).
r

John T. Barton testified that he occupied the house at 670
East 4800 South from January, 1954 until the· fall of 195S;t
\vhen Mr. Pack.1rd bought the property from Mr~ Knaus
(R. 143-144). There was· a driveway on the west s.ide of the
Knaus property and he d.ld not use the driveway to the east
\vhich \V~lS about 40 inches east of his house and there were
large boulders on the west side of the drive\vay along the
north~south edge of it (R. 144). The redwood fence which
7
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is. now on the property is approximately

tv~:o feet east

of the
wes terrunost edge of the driveway as he recalls it ( R. 145)
There \Vas a peg ncar the sidewalk on the west of the Manning
property and wher~ the bo_ulders. were on the east side he
r

ass rnned ~T as _the property line (R. 146) . This peg is shown

by the dot in a ~1rcle o~ ~xhibft 13 (R. 117).
Ge~trude

Skog testified that sh_e has lived at 671 East
1800 South for 2~ years, across the street north from the property in dispute. Ivlr. Lin.nell O\vned alJ of the property when
she moved there (R. 138). When Mr. Smith bought his
portion of the property there \\:ere fio~·ers where the Packard

and Knaus house nO\V is and the drive\\Ta.y west of the Smith
and Manning house has been there as long as .s.he can remember. It had not been .chat~ged nntil Mr. Mann.ing changed _it

(R ... 139). The red fence is t\VO feet farther east than she
.recalls the west edge of the drivt\vay (R. 139). The driveV!?ay
ran straight south past the gar.age and back to the red barn
(R·. 139) . The drive\v a y · was used to reach the· garage and
the barn and she never sa Vot' the LinneUs get on to or off · of
the property in any other tnanner (R. 110 and 141).
1\1rs~

Lois Manning testi£ed that when she and her hus.-

band pu rchascd the Linr:tell property ther~. were a flower bed
and .$ld ewalk v..~est of the house, then about ten £~et of la\\r n
with trees on it and the drive~way \Vest of that with a garage
and barn out in tbe back (Dep. 12).
·Exhibit 6 is ·a 195 6 survey of the property which shows

the di5tance along 48th South Street to be 64.16 feet between
the east lot line and the Jine west of the east 10 feet of Lot 2,
which is approxim ately in the ccn ter of the driveway. 1t
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shows the driveway· to extend almost precisely north and

south back to a point in Lot 34 where there is a concrete slab
upon which was situated the red b.arn. It will be noticed
that the east fence is almost on the line of the east portion

of this slab which accounts for the· description ·that the fence
ran to the chicken coop and then continued south.

Exhibit 6 sho\vs the measurement of 64.16 feet to run
from the west edge of the present gravel driveway to the east

edge of the survey line of Lot 1, with a space of 13.2 feet

between the \vest edge of the present driveway and the east
face of the Peterson-Kna u.s house. If the additional six feet
shown on Exhibit 6 were subtracted from 13.2 lt would place

the west edge of the original driveway 7.2 feet east of the
'II

east face of the Peterson-Knaus house.

Finding of. Fact No. 6 reads as follows:
HAt the titne of said sale to the defendants Smith

the seller believed it was selling and the defendants
Smith believed they were buying the land containing
the house, garage and barn v.tith the land from the
fen·ce on the east to the west edge of the said right
of way) a distance of 64r 1 feet along the north line. >r

(R. 56).
Defend ant Smith testified that, ... Without the driveway:]

I don~t think I would have wanted the property~'' And it was
necessary in going in _and out of the garage to go to the west
edge of the driveway (R. 27).
Defendant Lois Manning te~tified in her deposition that

when they bought the property from Smith there was a fence
along the east side of the property where the white board fence
')
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iii

is no\v located (Dep. 5). Defendant R. V. Mabning tes.ti.fied
in his deposition that the lot which he agreed to purchase
from Smith in June of 1954 was long and narrow with straight
sides running north and south (Dep~ 22), at the west edge
of the existing driveway ·~vas the west boundary of the property
\Vhicb was pointed to as the property line ( Dep. 22) and
that he '\\ras shown tb e fence as the east boundary and the west
edge of the drivew·ay ·as the west boundary (Dep. 23).

Finding of Fact No~ 7 .refers to a survey made by one of
the predecessors of plain tiff on August 2, 1948, \V hlch was
rei ied on by plain tiff's predecessors un ti ~ the summer of 19 56
~Then defendant J\Ianning caused another survey to be made
Vi-Thich showed the land occupied by defendant to He six feet
cast of the 1and they had thereto£ore occ~.1 pied. The certi£ ea te
of survey (Exhibit 18) shows the survey to have been tnade
on August 2, 1948 as referred to by Mr. Fred J. Peterson
(R. 166-167). The northeast stake was in the center of the
irrigation ditch (R. 167) and was located by Mr~ Harton by
a circle and dot on Exhibit 13 (R. 147) . This appears to be
somewhat w· est of the line of the red fence on Ex hi bit 13.

Mr. Peterson tes tifi ed that he never attempted to u.se
the drive\vay (R. 165) as the driveway went with the LinnellSmith property ( R. 164) and he has at no time claimed to
be o~vner of the driveway (R. 169). Mr. Peterson also testified
that he drove a pickup truck betvt. een his house and the ditch
(R. 171 ) and that he allowed either seven or nine f e_et between·
his house and ~is east line (R. 172).
There was no dispute over the boundary between the
properties until July or August) 1956 (R. 100) ~ a few days
10
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before the survey made by Bush and Gudgell on August 7,

1956 (R. 101! Exrubits 6 and 16) This was the t1me of the
first dispute over the boundary (R. 101)
+

+

Finding of Fact No.8 recites that from 1939 to the swnmer
of 19 56 all interested parties assumed that the land of plain tiffs
and their predecessors lay west of the driveway (R+ 57).
Defendant Manning testified that there was no dispute

until 1956 (Manning Dep. 18, R. 100) . Barton a.sswned the
boulders marked the property line ( R+ 146) ; Peterson ·made
no claim to the driveway (R. 164, 165, 167, 169) and de·
fend an r S~nith so testified (Smith Dep. 7"' 8) 9, 18~ 32) .
Ira Packard testified that the old driveway 1·vas east of
the red fence as now Jocated (R. 215) and tb.at the old irri·
gation ditch

woutd be

west of the red fen~e (R. 216).

Ira Packard also testified that he never used· the disputed
driveway (R. 219) and that his conversation vidth defendant
Manning . about construction of the car port \vas after the
Bush and Gudgell survey (R. 219). Packard entered into .a
contract with Knaus on August 5~ 1955 for the purchase of
the Knaus property (Ex. 21 , R+ 1 98) + He became acquainted
with Mr. Manning three or four months later and the matter
of the boundary was discussed on a more or less friendlJ
basis until three or £our months before the action was startec
by the Mannings (R. 200) . The file shows that this action
\vas commenced in August 195 7.

11
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•
ISSUE OF RES JUDICATA
T'he .statements on the issue of res judicata contained in the
foregoing recitals establish the fact that the def en dan ts Man·
n ing are purchasing their property from the defendants Smith
and that there is no contrt?versy behveen themr The file in
Case K o. 11 3422 includes the intercogato ries submitted by

the Maonin gs to Smiths and the an Svlers there tor
lt 1s likewise uncontroverted that the Packards were
purchasing from present plaintiffs under a Uniform Real

Estate Contrali (Exhibit 21 ) Plaintiff Knaus kne\Y of· the
. earlier action but did not t es ti fy. Once "~hen Knaus \vas at
the Packard ·home~ Packard mentioned '~that they were having
a ~beef' with the neighboe' (Knaus Dep. 10). He had a
telephone conversation with Packard approxitnately August
1 0~ 195 7 in "W~hich Packard advised him of a letter from a
Mr. B~rker) attorney for Manning~ _"that he .~ntended to start
legal proceedin g5 to locate this disputed boundary line~' r and.
Knaus told Packard that he didn't know anything about the
boundary~ The personal conversation when Packard told him
about the n tbeef' ~Tith the neighbor on the east,'~ \\ras someI

time later {R~ 238) ~ This was said to be a t'beef' abou_t the
boundary line ( R~ 239) .
Plaintiff makes some cLiim to an independent cause o£
action because Fred J~ Peterson gave a quit-claim deed in 1958L

Fred

J
I

Peterson \\'as a v.r i tness in the earlier .action,

\V

hich he

knew to be over a boundary (R. 168) at which time he made
no claim to being an owner of the driveway (R. 169). The
deed (Exhibit 1~ p. 75) \vas given to clear up the title (R. 169)

and he thinks he was given $5 for the deed (R. 1.71 ) ~
12
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At the time of the tr j a 1 of this case; Ira Packard claimed
to have no interest in the land (R. 213) by reason of a quit~
claim deed (R~ 21 _) and 24) and agreement (R. '23) .

Mr. Packard testi.ficd that as soon as he was served with
the paper from Mr. Barker, he employed an attorney, Mr.
Hobbs~ and then called Mr Knaus on the telephone and told
him about the boundary trouble (R. 222) and after the com- ..
plaint was filed he talked to Mr. Krfaus again and told him
that we were having property diHiculties and that I had hired
J lawyer and that the thing had been set for trial and that
r

t-t

were going to court over the property~' (R. 22 3) . He. did
not tell Knaus that it ·was his responsibility or that he would
\Ve

have to clear up the question nor did he invite or require him

to come in and defend the action (R. 222) 223) 224) nor did
he say that if the action were lost he Vv~ould expect a~ adjustment on the contract or that he would be dissatisfied 'v ith

the property ( R. 224~ 225). The property was not _transferred
to Knaus because of dis sa tis£ action over 1osing the suit or the
property (R. 227') 228) but becau,st Packard qjust wouldn~t

like to live there any more,'~ although as far as the real es ta tc
value l:s concerned it v..~ ouldn, t make much difference ( R. 228) .
He was not willing to live next door to the Mannings any
more (R.- 233). And Knaus paid him what he thought he

should get for the property if sold to some third party (R. 233).
Appellants or Mr. Packard employed Mr. Beatie to take
over the case and handle the appeal (R. 208~ 221l 229] 230),
in which notice of appeal viaS filed (R~ 209) and then abandon ed (R. 2 30) . Packard de£ erred to Knaus apparently lea vi.ng
the decision tq him. or Mr. Beatie (R. 231). Mr. Knaus had
13
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conversations with Mr. Reed and Mr. White, the Packards and
~[r.

Hobbs, Packard's

.attorney~ ~Thile the decision on appeal

of the pr~ious action was pending (Knaus Dep ~ 11-13)
(Int. _·6~ R+ 22) +

COMPOSING DIFFERENCES
Counsel for plaintiff tried to make an admission of weakness out of defendants ~tannings' willingness· to

compose

the ?ifficulty. In the first place~ the strip of Jand is probably
not ~rorth any more intrinsica[ly than the strip to the ~ast of
the Manning ho1ne which was purc:has ed for $200 (R. 113) .
It has additional vaJu€ to defendant Manning because it gives
access to the rear of the land

v~rhich

and Exhibits .6, 16, 9, 13 and 1.4)

7

is 500 feet deep (R. 1.30
Mr. Manning testified a

willingness to b~ y the land from Packard ( R. 131 ~ Manning
Dep. 18 ~ 2 5) and he testified
tbta he would rather give up the
,-.,.
strip in back than fight ·wit];l other neighbors over it (R. 123~

129) as a means of preserving friendship (R. 117, 137).

POINTS RELIED ON
Respondents submit that there are three questions in which
this Court might be interested) the first one and perhaps the
second on the appeal and the third and per haps the second
on the cross a. ppeal:
Point 1.. Was the drive\vay included in the sale to Smith
by the common owner ?
Point 2. Was the action between Ma.nnings and Packa rds

res jud~~a ta of this action and are plaintiffs estopped to maintain
this action ?
14
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ARGUMENT
1. WAS THE DRIVEWAY INCLUDED IN THE SALE

TO SMITH BY THE COMMON OWNER?

is resolved in favor of the respondentj there
Js no need to consider any other point on the appeal.
If this question

Judge Ell etf s oral decision was that the conflicting surveys
1n 1948 and 1956 and the understandings of the common
owner .and the Smiths establish the property from the east
to the west edge of the dri~eway as the property purchased
(R. 241 ).'
The judgment is supportable ori three bases:

a. On the theory of practical location of the la.nd.

b. The 1948 survey located the boundary as west of the
driveway.
c. The driveway was part of the home and lot.

a. On the theory of practical location of the land.
This is somewhat different from boundary by acquiescence
although the two are related and frequently are discussed together without a clear 1ine of dis tinction~

Tiff any on Real Property, Third
exp la.ins the doctrine:

Edition~

Section 6 5 5, thus.

~ ·~ot

in£ requently reference is made to the 'practical
1oca tion' · by the par ties to a conveyance~ of the bound.a ry

or boundaries refer red to therein. This expression refers
to a designation of the line by agreement bernTeen
the gran tee and the gran tor~ the Ia tter retaining the
ad joining land~ followed by possess ron in accordance

lS
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ill

therewith, or to posses sian up to a certain line by
each of the parties, ~· ithou ~ any s~ecllic agreement. * *
... The expression practical location of the boundaries
has also been applied to the location made by the
com~on grantor. Where this location is accepted and
acquiesced in, it is the true location arid binding~ w itbout r~gard to the lapse of time."
· -

And tlike,vise Thorn pson on Real Property, Permanent
Section 3301:

Edition~

~

-=·under proper cira1mstances~ there may be a prac~
tical location of a doubtful boundary line by an agree~ .
ment bet-vio·een the adjoining O\vners, followed by acquiescence in the location made and occupancy in accordance there~vith, which will be binding both on such
owners themselves and on their grantees . . . A practic a 1 location made by a mutual grantor is binding
on the grantees, for it is presumed to be the line mentioned jn the deeds.'
1

Tiff.any cites· H et"S e

A-1 ezza, 10

App~ Div. 59} 91

NYS
78~ which holds under similar facts that the doctrine aplies and
no lapse of time is necessary Thornpson cites, among other
tJ'S.

r

cases~

Young vs. Hyland, 3 7

U~ 229~ 108

p. 1124.

Young t's. f! yland is quite similar to the case at bar.
plain tiff \VaS deeded a lot 34.6 feet by 141 .5 feet v.ri tb the
south line of Lot 10 of a qSouth Ogden Surveyn .as his south
boundary. Defendant was deeded a part or Lot 11 so that the
south boundary of plaintiff and the north boundary of defend~t were

coterminous, both by deed and by occupancy.
A fence existed at the supposed south boundary five feet south
of .a Ia ter survey 1ine which had rep laced earll er and. successive
fences. At the times of purchase by plaintiff and his prede-
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cesso rs each had been shown the land as being bounded by
the fen(e. The original survey was not _identified by monuments
and the later survey ~vas made after the controversy arose. The
trial court found for defendant and this court reversed~ holding

.

.

that there was a pr actica 1 location of the boundary at the
fence line which was acquiesced in for many years by the
parties and their predeces~sors. The court said;
~;:The

plain tiff tes t~fied that~ ~Then he bought the
land~ the agent of his grantor went v,;T ith h i.m on the
ground, and told him that it ;: runs to the fence· p. ·
232.
t

j

practica lloca tion of a boundary line rna y be, .and
often is~ agreed upon) fixed~ and established) either
by an expre:S s agreement, or by acquiescence, v.dthou t
surveys. It may be so agreed to and fixed before~ as
well as after, the making of an official survey.. The
practic~l location so fixed may be in accordance or
in conflict with such survey. When the tract V/ as ta id
off into city lots and blocksj we do not see any reason
why the lando\\·n ers tould not thereafter adopt a
fence] which was then there] as the boundary line
between lots 1 0 and 11 to the same effect a5 though ·
they had thereafter constructed, or agreed uponj or
·acquiesced in) . . a new fence~ as and for the boundary
line'" p.. 234.
~·A

is a well~settled rule of la\v~ resting upon public
policy, that a practical 1ocation of boundar ic.s vl hich
has been acquiesced in for a long period of years will
not _be disturbed. It is binding on the parties thereto
and their privies in estate. This doctrine has been
ad opted as a rule of repose VoJT i th a v iev{ of quieting
titles and preventing 1i ti gati on'~ p. 2 3 5.
4

t

{t

per tin en t question rs not where is the south~
east corner of Lot 10 and the south boundary line of
~'The
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•
the lot coextensive therewith) according to some particular official survey. made by or under the direction
of Ogde:n City, but, as between the adjoining landqwn ers, where is tha. t point·· as it wa.s originally fixed
and establisheq by an original or primary survey, or

by

a

practical location agreed upon or acquiesced in

for a Ion g period of time by the persons in tere.sted ~ ~

p.

2·37~

In the instant case the practical location was by the common grantor .and the second survey~ in 1948, evidently confirmed the original survey~ according to which the east fence
was built and the common grantor had occupied~ as well as
making the prru.: tic a i location of the boundary with both
grantees. Only the 19 56 survey created the conflict.
Practical location establishes the boundary and binds the

parties~. Subsequent survey~ and acquiescence are not essential
and do not change the boundary~ although Young vs. Hyland
found both practical location and long acquiescence.
It has been cited numerous times by this Court, the instances most helpful to the facts of this case being Warren

v. A1azzuchi1. 45 U. 612, 616, 148 P. 360, (line established on
line indicated by co1nmon grantor) ; Nelson vs. DaRouc h,
87 U. 45 7, 466, 50 P. 2d 273, (practical boundary disrnssed) ;
Hurnmel vs. Young~ 1 U. 2d 237, 243, 265 P. 2d 410, (purpose
is to stabilize titles a.nd prevent iitiga tion) .
b .. The 1948 survey located the boundary as

u~est

of the drit.=e-

u~ay.

Evidence of this survey was received without objection~

from Fred J. Peter~on (R+ 166~167) and John Barton (R. 146).
The first survey of the subdivision is evidenced by Exhibit 1
18
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p. 2 3

anJ the plat in the back thereof. The third survey IS
shown by Exhibits 6 and 16.

These facts create an uncertainty which was properly re.
solved through parol evidence~ Detroit, Grand Haven and
Milwaukee Railroad vs. Ho\\rland~ 246 Mich. 318~ 224 N~W.
) GG ~ 68 ALR 1 and annotation following~ especially pp. 5~ ·
47~49, 74-76,

arid 78. Page S of the annotation defines a latent
ambiguity which rna y be resolved by evidence as arising when
a plain de~cription is applied to the land.
Langton~
t".

See Moye1· -z-·x.

37 lJ. 9, 16, 106 P. 508.

The dt<iveway

WaJ

part of the home and lot.

The evidence amply supports an easement lfl favor of
Smith over the driveway. There was a conveyance by the
common owne:r, there ·was an open and obvious and long·
standing use of the driveway to reach the garage and other
outbuildings on the property being sold, and there was no other
reasonable and available means of reaching the rear portion
of the property. T honlpJon_ vs. N elJon, 2 ·u. 2nd 340 at 346]
273 P 2nd 720; Adam_ron vs. Brockbank) 1.1 2 U. 52~ 18 5 P 2nd
264 (reasonable necessity is sufficient); Rollo vs~ N elsonf
34 lJ. 116, 96 P 263, 26 L.R.A. (NS 315); Thompson, Real
Property] Section 339.

.

The on Iy difficult qu es t.ion is w hethcr full ownership
of the driveway passed to Smith under the cin_umstances of

this case. It is plain that the common owner believed that he
·was selling the house and the d ri vew .a y since the fence to the
east and west line of the driveway \Vere pointed out as the
boundaries and the west boundary \Vas pointed out as running
19
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from the western edge of the horizontal markings in the side-

walk to a post in the fence at the rear of the land. The
description used was of Lot 1 plus 10 feet of Lot 2l making
a total 0 f 64 1 feet, which is the amount 0 f Land CITI braced
betw-een the east fence and the 'vest line of the driveway
according to Exhibits 6 and 16. Under these circumstances,
the land conveyed included the driveway as part of the tractl
r

the .d~ive~ay being appurtenant to the house and outbuildings.
U~der

the title t~appurtenance'' in 6 C.J.S.
this st.a tetnent:

pp.

136, appears

'{In a technical sense~ it has beeo said~ land can never
be an appurtenance to land; but where from the con·
.text and the facts of the particular case an intent to
pass land is rnanife~t, the courts will heed the intent
and the 1and \··vi 11 be treated as an appurtenance.''
Thompson on Re.al Property has this to say:
I.

~~where

plaintiff in ejectment offered evidence that

the former owner pointed out certain landmarks and
corners claimed by him to shoVtr the locd.tion of the
boundaries of his land~ it was held that, since plaintiff's
title was to be determined by the location of such
former owt:~er' s corners:t evidence of the marks and
corners as pointed out was primary and not hearsay
and \Vas admissible to show tb e true location as understood by the parties at the time~' Section 3285.

And again;
~'It

is always competent to give in evi dcnce ex is tin g
circumstances~ such as the actual condition and si tuation of land, buildings, passages~ water courses~ and
local objects in order to give. definite meaning to the
language used in a deed and to show the sense in which
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particular words \ver e u~ ed by the pa.rtles, es pecia 11 y
10 matters of descriptionl' Section 3287~
It is plain that when Mr. Linnell ref erred to Lot 1 and to
the east 10 .feet of Lot 2~ he was referring to Lot 1 as starting

at the eastern fence and that he believed that the driveway was
on Lot 2 and he therefore included the easterly 10 feet of that
lot.
In American

Jur i5 prudence)

Section 295 of Deeds and

Conveyances, it is said: '"Land may, however, be made appurtenant to other land by the intent and acts of the parties:t''
citing Sic! el v.r. Lauer~ 148 Pa. 2 36, 23 A. 996, and Alford rs.
Rodgers; 242 Ala. 370, 6 So. 2nd 409~ and further that, nland
adjacent to the building must pass

-vtr here

circumstances show

that the grantor must have intended to convey

it.'~

Citing

Maddox t··s. Goddat·d, 15 Me. 218~ 33 Am. Dec. 604, where
the words, ~~one-quarter of the Durgin Sa\vmllr~ incJuded as
much land a5 was necessary and customarily used.
In the Siet el case~ supra, a statute vested in counties~ jails
and the portions of land appertaining to the jails and the court
was cons truing a deed conveying a jail with this statute also
before it and said:
''\X/ hi 1e~ as a general rule, land cannot be a ppurtenant to LaH.L yet it may be made so by the intent

*

ancl acts of the parties. *
* 1 he use of this strip
of land permitted by the deed of lst December~ 1772,
indicates such an intention., at least sufficiently to
permit it to be regarded as an appurtenance to the jail
property within the spirit of. the act of 1834:t and]
as such~ t(} the extent of the estate held by the com~
missioners to have thereby become vested in the county

of

1

Berks~··

2l
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The driveway in this case never has been used by anyone
. else· and never will be used by the plaintiffs, since the driveway
to their garage lies w~st of their house. It would seem a futile
thing to give the driveway to the defendants for their exclusive
use and withhold title. Such ~vas not the intent of the parties,
who clearly supposed tha. t the driveway was included with
the description and intended that the driveway should go \Vith
the house, the garag~ and the other outbuildings.
2. HAS· THE BOUNDARY BEEN ESTABLISHED BY
ACQUIESCENCE AT THE WEST LINE OF THE DRIVE·
WAY?
The recent cases decided by this Court, .and the artie Ie in
3 Utah Law Retii eu~ on establishment of boundaries by acquiescence have perhaps made counsel overly interested in this
doctrine, with a tendency to lneasure all cases thereby. The
salient feature of the doctrine is that it is one of repose~ to
enable parties to continue in possessiqn of their accepted lru t ds
and to avoid ~itigation. To this same end are the doctrines of
ad verse possessjon, boundary by practical location, estoppel,
and acceptance of evidence to explain latent ambiguities in
deeds. \X1h ether the facts of this case fit most closely the rule
of boundary by acquiescence is for this Court to decide~
In the first tria 1 of this controversy, Case ~r (} _ 113 4 2 2

J

the tria.l Court held that the Mannings were entitled to the
drive~~ay on the theori.e.s of both boundary by acquiescence
and that the driveway was appurtenant to the Linnell- Smith
home. In the present case, Judge Ellett decided the case on the
theory of practical location of the boundary or parol evidence
to establish an intended boundary. Not knowing how this
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Court \\·'ill vie\v the £acts~ respondents cross appealed to bring
before this Court the theory of boundary by acquiescence.
This Court we 11 knows the requirements of the doctrine~ as

expressed in sev era! recent cases. We shall therefore present
to the Court on 1jl the three aspects of tb is doctrine which,
it appears to respondents~ might be questioned under the facts

of .this ca.se:
a. Did a dispute or uncertainty exist?

b. Is the boundary line established ?
c. What is the statu tory or other period of req nired acqu iescence?

a. Did a diJpute or uncertainty exiJt?
It 1s undisputed that the western boillldary of this property,

at the wes~ern edge of the driveway, was believed by the
common grantor to be described in the deed to Smith and

the deed to Burt A. Hughes. Mr. Linnell established the driveway as a convenience, believing that his home ,..,. as si tria ted on
Lot 1, which extended 54.1 feet to the eastern edge of the
driveway and that the driveway Vv~as 10 feet in width and
occupied the easterly 10 feet of Lot 2. The dispute or un~
certainty must therefore be implied or be found to exist as a
matter of law because the actua I location of the boundary was
in fact uncertain and the subject matter of an inchoate dispute.
If the doctrine be correctly described as nbounda.ry by acqui~
escence ~} then the acquiescence should be the sa lien t £eatu re
and not the fictional settlement of a difference. This Court
has said that the fictional agreement is so definitely established ·
by the 1on g period of acquiescence that evidence of it .is p rc-
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ciuded and immaterial. Motzkus
244, -322 p . 2d 3914 .

It would seem that;

VJ

Cat-rollj 7

u~ 2d 237 at

vie~·ing

the doctrine as one of rep:>se,
the dispute or . uncertainty also becomes a fictional thing, as
indeed it does from· the ruling that the dispute will be presumed (Mot:Zkus vs. Carroll, supra, at p. 243) and wtcertainty
as to the accurate locatio~ of tbe boundary, either subjective
or objective~ should be .su.fficient This is contrary· to the
suggestion in 3 Lrtab Law Review at. p. 511 ~ which suggests
that there must be a su bj ective uncertainty.
In Willie vs. Local Realty Co., 110 U~ 52~ at 531, 175
P 2d 718 at 723~ and Ekberg vs. Bates, 121 V~ l23 at 127, 239
P. 2d 205~ this Court held that the fact that the correct boundary

could

b~

rea.dil y ascertaine<J did not eliminate the requisite
uncerta.lnty. That doesn't ans~·er our situation where all paJ:"ties
· assumed the indicated boundary was correct when in fact
surveyors could not agree as to its correctness and there was
an objective o! d etno n.strabl e uncertainty.
209 P~ 2d
2 57, the Court ~eems to hold that lack of awareness of un-

In Glenn vs. Whitney, 116 U. 267 at

272-273~

c.ertainty is not enough+ And yet in M.otzkus vs. Carroll, supra~
·at p. 243~ the Court quotes from Brown vs. Milliner that uncertainty ~\vill be implied from the parties' long acquiescence~'t
If the parties know where the true boundary is, they
generally cannot trans fer title by an oral agreement on a
diHerent .line. Jensen vs. Bartlettj 4 lJ. 2d 58~ 60, 286 P. 2d 804.
In the following cases the parties had a survey made
and relied on· the survey as es tablj shing the boundary, having
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no doubt or ·uncertainty as to. the sufficiency of the survey.
Following sufficient periods of acquiescence,

later

surveys

established the error of the boundary line upon which they
had relied. In each case, the Court held that a sufficient un.

certainty existed in their minds to satisfy the requirement pf
boundary by acquiescence, \V hich uncertainty was evidenced by
their reliance ltpon a .:;urvey. Silva tJ_L Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495~
17? P. 929; lHoniz tJS, Peterman~ 220 Cal. 429} 31 P 2d 353;
13euson t--'J. Daily, 38 Neb. 155, 56 NW 788. These situations
are s~milar to tbe facts of this case, where the parties were
uncertain as to the land they \vere purchasing and relied on
ljnnell~ \vho pointed out to them the boundary as being 'vest
of the drive,vay. They relied on this, occupied up to 1t~ built
in reliance on it~ and claimed nothing on the far side as in
the cases cited. These cases are consistent with the theory of
repose. ln these cited cases 7 the parties were dividing tracts

of land and sirnply had a surveyor indicate ~~here the division
line was. This actualJy involved no uncertainty whatever but a
\villingness to rely on someone~ s advice

in locating the boundary

between them.

T"his type of evidence, being consistent

~·ith

the rea$onlng

of these cases~ does not rebut the presumption of the existence
of a d ls. pute or uncertainty fo llo'v ed

by an agreement settling

the uncertainty and fixing the Jine.

/;. Is the boundary line established?
Many of the cases refer to fences as the visible evidence of

the line established by the parties by agreerru~nt and acqui·
esced in for long times. In iWatzkus VJ. Carrol( supra, the Court
quoted from Brown t.'J, Milliner that ... the line must be open~

2S
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1!1

visible, marked by monuments, fences o.r buildings.~~ In that
ca"se the Court found sufficient a string of posts with . two
strands of wire~ the posts varying in thicknes~ anc many of
them out of repair and leaning~ In the case at bar the boundary
was. indicated by the side of a well-traveled driveway, by the

b2:nk of an irrigation ditch~ by boulders placed along the edge
of the driveway, by a surveyor~ s stake placed in front, by
· picket ·on the fence at the rear and by separation cracks in the
sidewalk with verticaL 1ines running to the separation crack,
and by trees along the westerly edge, and a house to the west

Appellan.ts argue in their brief that the '~true ~oundary ,,
w~s

recognized and that this defeats the acquiescence. In the
first place, 1earning of the location o £ the true boundary must
al~ays occur before a question of acquiescence can arise. And
secondly~ abandoning the acquieSced bpundary at the rear
does not affect the boW1dary up front Rydatch vs. Anderson,
37 u~ 99, 1os, 111~ 112 .
.

t'l

... The west line of the driveway
on the survey (Exhibit 6)

+

is now obliterated except

Some of the evidence locates it

two feet west of the redwood £eoce (Exhibit 13 ~ R~ 145 ~ 1 39) .

Th c fence was built in accordance with the decree in the earlier
case and in this case it was confirmed by the decree. It .ls 64.1
feet west of the east fenc~ and at the west line of the driveway

according to most of the evidence (R. 167,

171~ 172,

215,

Exhibits 6, 9)· 14).

c. What is the statutory or othet" period of required acquiescence?
In Motzkus vs. Carroii1 the Court finds acqu1escence
for a s uff icien t period ~ tw hether it takes only seven years or
'l6
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more than twenty years)'' in die a ting the possibility that the
question is still open. But in Hkberg l-'J. Bate.s, supra, the Court
held that acquiescence for eight years was more than enough
under Section l 04-2-6 UCA 1943, which is now 78-12·6 UCA
l \}) _).

3. WAS THE ACTION BETWEEN MANNINGS AND
PACKARDS RES JUDICA1~A OF THIS ACTION AND ARE
•
PLAiNTIFFS ESTOPPED TO MAINTAIN THIS ACtiON?
This question was raised in the pleadings:t at the pre--trial,

and by motion for summary judgment .and \vas .finally. disposed
of by the trial judge with these words:
~·1

don't think there is anything to this res adjudicata
business. I think it is a law suit that has to be tried
over beca.us e somebody didn ·t ·make these owners partics in interest, but I don~t think there is any question
at all but what this taw suit would be just the same
as if it were bet~veen Linnell and Slnith * * * '' .(R.
240-241).
This point is covered briefly, not so much to urge it upon
the Court~ as to bring it before the Court in the event the Cou ~t

is unable to agree with the trial Court in its disp~sition of this
case) or with the theory o £ boundary by acqui escencc as accepted
by the trial Court in the first trial of this controversy.
It is plain that the issues in Case No. 113422 and in the
instant case are the same, and that the property involved is
the same. It is also plain that the parties are different~ on 1y
the Mannings being parties in both actions with no diff~rences
between the respondents, and the question therefore is whether
the pia in tiffs in this Etigation are in privity \Vi th the de fen dan ts
to the earlier case.
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In Rody vs; i\1oyle) ( Md.) 29 A. 2nd 290, the plaintiff
sought to. relitigate ownership of funds, having testified in
a former action in which he was not a party, and the court

said:
qPersons who are directly interested in the suit! and
have knowledge of its pendency., and who refuse or
neglect to appear and a vail themselves of their rights~
are concluded by the proceedings as eliectually as if
they ~vere parties named on the record. 't
Slight evidence of privity ~·ill support estoppel for prior
adjudication where the issues are the same) as public policy

requires an end of litigation. Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi Cola~ 36
Del. .124~ 172 A. 260; Dupont deNemout"J vs. Richmond Guano
Co., (C.A. Va.), 297 Fed 580:
~~A suit duly prosecuted in good faith~ and followed
by a judgment or ·decree, is constructive notice to ever j;
person who acquires from a defendant, pendente lite
an interest in the subject matter of the litigation) of
the legal and equitable rights of the plaintiff, as charged
in the bill or complaint, and established by the judgment or decree.~~ Freeman on Judgments~ Section 188.
t4.0ne who is neither a party or privy or purchases
pendente Jite] is not bound, but he who purchases or
goes into possession during the pendency of the suit
is bound by the decree that is made against the person
from \Vhom he derives title. The law is that he who
intermeddles ~;ith property in litigation does it at hts
peril~ and is as conclusively bound by the results of
the litigation, \vhatever they may be, as if he had been
a party to it from the outset. Herman on Judgments}
Section 186~
It

The plaintiffs knew of the li~igation benv.een the Mannings
and Packards and didn ~ t testify because they knew nothing
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about the boundary~ They consulted with Mr. Hobbs and with
Mr. Beatie while the decision to appeal was pending, later
obtained a deed to a foot of ground from Pred J. Peterson,
who. testified at the earlier case, and then b rough t this action
to relitigate the same question+ '"fhere was not a rescission of

the contract as a rna tter of right or for failure of consideration;
but the P ackards sold the land back to the plain tiff bee.a use
they didn't want to live there any more (R. 228) and because
the plaintiff gave them \V hat they would expect anyone eJ se
to give ( R. 233) Plaintiffs in effect bought out Packard and
stand in Packard~s shoes; they knew of the litigation as it was
+

pending) a.nd they kne\v that the appeal was being a ban cloned.
The poI icy against mu 1ti pl ici ty of sui t5 over the same question
invites the holding that the first action

as to the parties n O\V be fore the court~

\V

~T as

an adjudication

ho were privies to t hc

parties in the earlier action.

CONCLUSION
A large number of witnesses was called, several d~posi
tions were taken and a number of in terra gatories ~·ere sub~

mitted in order to bring before the trial court all relevant
facts concerning the. right to continue to occupy this six foot
strip of ground. 1"he court was v..rell informed and concluded
that it had been the obvious intent of the parties that this ..
ground pass to the Smiths and oot to the parties to the v.,· est
of the driveway) which con clus.ion v.~ as confirmed by the
conflicting _surveys+ 1~he. court adopted the recent Bush and
Gudgell survey as the bas ~s for the description quieting
title) wtihout deciding 1;vhich of the surveys accurately locates
the ground.
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•
The decision of the District Court is amply supported by
the evidence and should be a£f irmed without modification.
Defendants also pre sen ted evidence on the theories · of
boundary by acquiescence and res judicata ·by a former trial.

The evidence of boundary by acquiescence amply shows that
the parties occupied up to- the west line of the driveway and
rna de no claim across tha.t line, that it was a well-designed
boundary marked by boulders, trees and a post in the fence at
the back end and by a separation crack and later by a surveyor~ s
. p~g at the north end. There was acquiescence for eleven years
from 1945 to 1956, or if the court looks at the date August 2,
1948~ when P.eterson had a survey made, there was acquiescence
for approximately eight years to the time in 1956 when. a later
survey \\ras made+
The plaintiffs in this action were fully aware of the pri-or
li ti gati on and v.rer e cons u 1ted to determine

hether they had
any evidence bearing on the issues of that case~ Under these
circumstances plaintiffs should be estopped from relitigating
these issue.s and the prior adjudication should stand.
\V

All of t h c doctrines discus sed relate to the policy to end
disputes with reference to land boundaries where the boundaries have long been established and fully recognized~ The
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

_Respectfully

submitted~

C. PRESTON ALLEN and
RICHARD L~ BIRD~ JR.
Attorneys for Respondent
Salt Lake City, Utah
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